Rulemaking, the process through which United States (U.S.) federal government agencies develop major health, safety and economic regulations, was an early target of electronic government (e-government) efforts. Because it was an established decision-making process that had substantial formal requirements of transparency, public participation and responsiveness it seemed a perfect target for technology-supported participatory policymaking. It was believed that new technologies could transform rulemaking, increasing its democratic legitimacy and improving its policy outcomes by broadening the range of participating individuals and groups (Brandon and Carlitz, 2003; Coglianese, 2004; Noveck, 2004) . Despite the promise of a more deliberative and democratic process, rulemaking efforts have failed to produce broader meaningful public engagement. In this paper we examine if lack of adoption of participatory eRulemaking platforms can be explained by the disruption to agencies' established rulemaking practices. We will consider how agencies react to technological innovation as a risk due to their deep-rooted organizational cultures and the impact of judicial and political oversight. We will provide examples of agency risk and culture, including from our own experiences with RegulationRoom, a socio-technological participation platform that has facilitated public participation in six federal rulemakings. We will also draw on a comparison of for-profit 2 businesses and rulemaking agencies in thinking about motivation to adopt (or avoid) new technologies.
businesses and rulemaking agencies in thinking about motivation to adopt (or avoid) new technologies.
I. Introduction
For decades, rulemaking -the process by which federal agencies make new environmental, consumer protection, financial and other regulations -has included substantial participation rights for stakeholders and members of the general public. However, these participation rights have typically been exercised only by sophisticated insiders such as large regulated corporations and trade associations (Farina, Epstein, Heidt, and Newhart, 2012) .
Individuals, small businesses and civic organizations directly affected by regulation have been conspicuously absent. Because of this, the rulemaking process has been criticized as a highly technocratic process, where substantive participation comes from only a small number of insidethe-beltway professionals (Noveck, 2015) .
Since the late 1990s, the advent of digital technologies have been predicted to change this situation (Brandon and Carlitz, 2003; Coglianese, 2004; Noveck, 2004) . However, even the creation of a government-wide eRulemaking portal, Regulations.gov, through which users can view rulemaking proposals and submit comments, has had little effect on broadening effective rulemaking participation. Former U.S. Deputy Chief Technology Officer Beth Simone Noveck (2015) has said that implementing the Open Government vision of collaboration and conversation between government and citizens would "require a radical reinvention of government: fundamentally redesigning, not merely reforming, how institutions make decisions by opening them up to the value embedded in citizens' skills, talents, and abilities."
We have identified elsewhere the design requirements of a system that supports a deliberative, knowledge-building process in rulemaking participation (Farina, Newhart, and Blake, 2015; Farina, Epstein, Heidt and Newhart, 2014) . This paper explores why government has not adopted technological innovations that would enable and facilitate collaboration and conversation between government and citizens in rulemaking. In thinking about the adoption of such participatory eRulemaking technologies, we will look at how agencies react to technological innovation as a risk. Others have observed that technology innovation can be perceived by government as challenging or even disruptive (Mergel, 2013; Christen and Overdorf, 2000; Rogers, 2003) . There have been few attempts to systematically review the risks that influence the adoption and implementation of e-government technologies (Weerakkody, El-Haddadeh, Al-Sobhi, Shareef, and Dwivedi, 2013) . Here, we argue that systems that provide opportunities for expanded participation beyond the traditional rulemaking process are potentially disruptive to agencies, and that this perception of risk influences government decisions around adopting participatory eRulemaking systems. We will explore federal agency organizational culture and the impact of judicial and political oversight on agency willingness to take risks with new technologies. Examples are provided to support understanding of agency risk and culture. We draw from our own experiences with Regulation Room, a sociotechnological participation platform that has facilitated public participation in six federal rulemakings. We will also draw on a comparison of for-profit businesses and rulemaking agencies in thinking about motivation to adopt (or avoid) new technologies.
II. Rulemaking

A. The Traditional Process
Rulemaking is one of the U.S. federal government's most important methods of making public policy (Kerwin, 2003) . Congress makes laws that are often abstract and delegates policy and technical issues to agencies, who must implement them by providing specific guidelines (Muhlberger, Stomer-Galley, and Webb, 2012; Brandon and Carlitz, 2002) . In the typical rulemaking, the federal Administrative Procedure Act requires that the originating agency give the public notice of what it is proposing and why. The agency must then allow time, typically 60-90 days for important rules, during which any interested individual or entity may comment on the proposal. By law, the agency must consider every comment. If it decides to adopt its proposed regulation, it must demonstrate this consideration in a written statement that responds to relevant questions, criticisms, arguments, and suggestions (Lubbers, 2012) . The public record of the rulemaking -including all submitted comments -is used by the courts in settling any challenge that may be brought against the rule.
Although rulemaking's notice and comment process enables anyone to submit a comment, the process is not like a ballot initiative or an up-or-down vote. Decades of judicial elaboration have constructed rulemaking as a process in which outcome legitimacy turns on a formally transparent process of reasoned deliberation (Lubbers, 2012; Kerwin, 2003) .
Rulemaking is not a plebiscite; hence, mere expressions of outcome preferences hold little value for agencies. Effective commenters create value by articulating legal, factual, and/or policy reasons for their preferred outcomes. An agency is not permitted to base its final rule on the number of comments of those who support over those who oppose it. The final rule's justification must be based on sound reasoning and address trade-offs and opposing views.
B. The Emergence of eRulemaking
Broadly defined, eRulemaking is the application of information technology to the rulemaking process. The first move towards eRulemaking was in 1994 when the Office of the Federal Register made the Daily Federal Register, the official daily publication for rules, proposed rules, and notices of Federal agencies and organizations, available online. By the start of the 21 st century, a limited number of agencies had begun building websites containing rulemaking documents, and they were allowing members of the public to submit comments by email (Coglianese, 2004; Lubbers, 2012) . A goal of these efforts was to make it easier for members of the public to learn about and participate in the rulemaking process. Rulemaking typically generates a large collection of documents, including proposed rule text, cost benefit analyses and other studies, and the public comments, which are referred to collectively as the rulemaking docket. Prior to online rulemaking, individuals would have to visit an agency's Washington, D.C. headquarters to access these rulemaking materials in the physical docket. First generation e-docketing efforts included the Federal Communications Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Agriculture's National Organic Program, and the Department of Transportation, which had one of the most extensive systems and was the first agency to move its entire rulemaking docket system online in 1998 (Gormley and Balla, 2013) .
Proponents believed that e-dockets would allow for more transparency, participation, and informed dialogue. They advocated creating moderated discussions and allowing the threading of comments (Brandon and Carlitz, 2002; Coleman and Gotze 2001) . At the same time, however, there were warnings of the downside to increasing public participation, for it would require agencies to read and react to a higher volume of comments, particularly in controversial rulemakings. Some argued that the model of careful individual consideration of each comment would be impossible, that agencies would be pressured to treat comments as a "running tally with the grossest sort of division -basically for or against" (Herz, 2004 Management System (FDMS) provided agencies the ability to keep rulemaking materials in digital form in e-dockets that could be accessed by the public (Lubbers, 2012) . By presidential order, most rulemaking agencies were required to use this new central eRulemaking system; agencies that had been proactive in developing their own systems were required to abandon those systems and migrate to FDMS (OMB, 2012). The head of the inter-agency eRulemaking team responsible for building FDMS described the difficulties in trying to implement the Initiative, "The serious problems that we encountered trying to implement this initiative really rested on a pretty common characteristic -the government cultural insensitivity and sometimes frustrating and impenetrable agency-specific business processes" (Morales, 2003) .
Despite considerable agency resistance, the combined force of the E-Government Act and the determination of the Bush Administration, produced a centralized federal eRulemaking system used by all but a handful of rulemaking agencies. Comments could now be filed digitally, rulemaking documents could be accessed online rather than an in-person visit to a docket room.
What did not occur in the creation of Regulations.gov and FDMS was a more participatory eRulemaking system that supports deliberation and knowledge-building. Suggestions that had been made for deliberative dialogues and online discussions among commenters were not included (Lubbers, 2012) . While technological advances can move rapidly, legal developments move far more slowly. There were many issues around eRulemaking that concerned agency lawyers and administrators. For example, interpretations of the Paperwork Reduction Act and the Privacy Act often make it impossible for agencies to collect demographic data and interest group affiliations from the public. Agencies have also struggled with merging blogs, twitter and other social networks with the traditional rulemaking process (Lubbers, 2012) . Some agencies, including the Department of Transportation (DOT), consider contact during the comment period to be problematic under internal ex parte contact polices (Farina et al., 2011) . Therefore, direct access to rulewriting personnel is forbidden, or severely constrained, from the time the comment period opens until the work on the rule has been finalized.
C. The Obama Administration Open Government Initiative
It was and to expand the use of Web 2.0 tools (Hunt, 2010) .
As the one-stop portal for citizens to review regulations open for comment and to submit their comments electronically, Regulatons.gov initially led to optimism for Open Government goals. It was believed it could make the rulemaking process more inclusive in scope and more open to public discussion (Carlitz and Gunn, 2005) . Experience has shown this optimism was misplaced. What Regulations.gov has provided, access to documents and the ability to input comments, is similar to most Open Government initiatives whose primary emphasis and implementation have been on transparency (Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Stern, 2011 ). The initial hope that moving the public comment process online would increase meaningful citizen participation has not come to pass (Mulberger et al., 2012) .
III. Rulemaking Innovation
The rulemaking process is an example of an established governance system that has encountered tensions between adapting to the demand for more participatory practices and working within "well-define and strictly applied rules, polices and organizational hierarchies" (Janssen & van der Voort, 2016) . As a way to overcome these tensions, agencies developed collaborations with academic and civil society researchers. Our own project, RegulationRoom, was initially a collaboration with DOT and CeRI (Cornell eRulemaking Initiative) that worked well because: (1) the agency leadership was strongly committed to using information technology to improve rulemaking; and (2) CeRI researchers were committed to developing systems and practices that would produce broader public engagement that the agency found useful in its rulemaking decisions (Farina et al. 2011 ). The types of comments that are of value to an agency in a rulemaking -ones with relevant information and sound reasoning, that address trade-offs and opposing views -can be encouraged through the use of deliberation platforms, such as
RegulationRoom, that seeks crowdsourced argumentation and deliberation, where the participants are asked to deliberate by exchanging arguments about a selected topic (Aitamurto and Chen, 2017) . This is a form of participation that reflects a view of democracy anchored in conceptions of accountability and discussion (Chambers, 2003) , infuses transparency to government (Aitamurto & Chen, 2017) , and at least potentially generates legitimacy (Richards and Gastil 2015) .
A. The RegulationRoom Project
RegulationRoom is an experimental platform for public participation in government rulemaking processes created by a cross-disciplinary group of Cornell researchers. CeRI used selected live U.S. federal rulemakings to experiment with human and computer support for public engagement and discussion. The ultimate goal of RegulationRoom was to provide guidance on design, technological, and human intervention strategies -grounded in theory and tested in practice -for effective eRulemaking systems.
CeRI researchers have developed expertise in: (1) using conventional and social media to alert and engage people who never before participated in rulemaking processes; (2) translating long, complicated government proposals into a concise and understandable online format; (3) educating people about rulemaking and other public policymaking processes; and (4) mentoring new participants in making comments that convey relevant knowledge and informed views.
RegulationRoom is purposefully designed to include elements that can make public policymaking more transparent, participatory, and collaborative. The design signals the importance of commenters' learning about, and engaging with, the substance of the agency's proposal. Rather than the conventional blog format of a column of text, below which the comment stream gradually develops, RegulationRoom topic pages are organized in a side-byside, two-column format. Because of the length and complexity of typical rulemaking documents, the content is triaged for importance and translated into comprehensible language.
This work was done manually by the CeRI team, as summarization and translating technologies,
as of yet, cannot accomplish this automatically. Several strategies are used to layer information.
Content is organized into manageable, discrete topics and subtopics that make sense to the target stakeholder groups. A navigation carousel and drop-down menus give an easy overview of the discussion's scope and allows participants to find the issues most meaningful to them. Glossaries are also utilized to assist participants with acronyms and words or phrases with technical meaning. To provide greater information depth for participants who wish to see the original agency documents, each subsection contains hyperlinks to the relevant portion of the primary rulemaking materials. The RegulationRoom participatory environment models the kind of engagement valuable in rulemaking and provides support for participants at whatever level of participatory skill they bring into the discussion. The side-by-side format continually reinforces the importance of acquiring information about the agency proposal, while the segmented topic and subtopic structure facilitates understanding the issues. Voting and ranking tools do not play a prominent role, to signal the deliberative rather than the aggregative nature of rulemaking.
Participants may endorse another comment, but no tally of the number of endorsements is displayed.
Human facilitative moderation supports participants in effective commenting. Helping participants to acquire the deliberative skills of giving reasons, substantiating claims, and acknowledging competing interests. The moderators were typically students in the e-Government 
B. Outcomes
In over six years of hosting online public commenting the platform was successful in utilizing strategies to support crowdsourced argumentation and deliberation to achieve informed, inclusive and insightful participation. That real world testing primarily involved participants with no prior experience in such policy processes (65%-95% self-reported newcomers). Even on complex and controversial questions, online discussion was thoughtful, informative, candid and civil.
During the course of the project, the RegulationRoom team partnered with the DOT and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to offer six live federal rulemakings. These rulemakings received approximately 2500 comments by over 750 individual users on the RegulationRoom platform (see Table 1 ). Even on complex and controversial questions -such as the accessibility standards for websites selling air travel, the extent to which mortgage holders should be required to assist borrowers in trouble, or the restrictions that should be placed on "robo-calls" in debt collection from consumers -the discussion on RegulationRoom was thoughtful, informative, candid and remarkably civil.
The project was lauded as a success by the heads of both partnering federal agencies.
CFPB Director Richard Cordray (2014) However, despite the accolades and the accomplishments of the project, the RegulationRoom technology and know-how has not been adopted by U.S. federal agencies.
1
The next section examines possible explanations for this.
IV. Innovation as Disruption
A. Overview
Rulemaking We argue that rulemaking agencies have a disposition of risk averseness to use innovative, potentially disruptive technologies, such as systems that encourage and facilitate broader public engagement in the rulemaking process. In part, this risk averseness is inherent and reflexive; in part, it is deliberate and reasoned. We explore each of these dimensions in turn.
B. Agency Culture
The Bush Administration eRulemaking Initiative that produced the federal rulemaking portal Regulations.gov was one element of an ambitious broader plan, the President's Management Agenda. This major, multi-faceted administrative reform initiative aimed to make the federal government more "citizen-centric, market-based, and results-oriented" (President's Management Agenda, 2002). In essence, the goal was to reorient federal agency behavior according to the principles, practices, and metrics of private corporations.
Within that framework, the emphasis on adopting innovative technologies (including eRulemaking) made sense. The dictates of the marketplace require that businesses, from their very beginning, offer something new or improved. Whether it be bringing a new product to the marketplace (e.g., Xerox), providing lower cost alternative goods through creative manufacturing (e.g., Ford Motors at the beginning of the 20 th century), or creating demand for a new service (e.g., Uber), the organizational culture of the private corporation is predisposed to embrace innovation, for without innovation the enterprise will not succeed initially and cannot sustain success (Downes and Nunes, 2013) .
However, government agencies have an organizational culture fundamentally different from that of the private corporation. This difference is rooted in a fundamentally different origin story. Private corporations are created to earn a profit. The Harvard Business School, which consistently ranks at the top of MBA programs with alumnae as Fortune 500 CEOs, is credited with honing the philosophy that for-profit corporations exist to make money for shareholders (McDonald, 2017; Stewart, 2017) . To be sure, this single-minded conception of the corporate mission has been challenged (McDonald, 2017; Stewart, 2017) . Still, even when businesses are supposedly created out of a founder's intellectual interest in or passion for a specific industry (e.g., Apple) or some extra-business goal (e.g., job creation, as with Shinola Watches out of Detroit), sustained profitability is the desideratum of survival. And, as Apple epitomizes, innovation is the engine of profitability (Christensen and Allworth, 2011) . By contrast, regulatory agencies are created to solve problems that, if left unchecked, will disrupt a segment of industry or society and cause harm. These problems -reducing pollution in the air, water and soil; preventing the marketing of adulterated food or unsafe drugs; reducing deaths from traffic accidents; remediating unsafe mines and other workplaces; regulating the financial markets to prevent fraud and other harmful practices without dampening beneficial entrepreneurial behavior -tend to be complex to the point of often qualifying as "wicked" problems.
3 They tend to involve multiple variables, including strongly conflicting stakeholder interests (e.g., environmentalists vs. mining industry) and trade-offs between important societal values (e.g., addressing global warming by cutting carbon pollution vs. loss of jobs in fossil fuel industry).
Every variable adds an element of complexity, and each variable itself, then, is a problem needing a solution -how to fit the individual variable into the whole without upsetting the delicate balance necessary to achieve its regulatory mission.
The result is a fundamentally different organizational orientation toward risk (Besley and Ghatak, 2003; Bozeman, 2002) . For-profit corporations have a culture of risk capitalization:
Continually seeking both greater efficiencies of operation and innovations that increase the market share of their products or services, they are predisposed towards openness to new, even disruptive, technologies (Downes and Nunes, 2013) . Risk-taking is necessary to achieve the organizational purpose of increasing shareholder profits (Kose, Lubomir, and Yeung, 2008) .
Regulatory agencies have a culture of risk mitigation (Workman, 2015; Davidson, 2014) . Not only are their missions far more complex, but the metrics, and even the meaning, of success are far more contestable. Innovation -particularly innovation that disrupts the status quorepresents not an opportunity to be capitalized upon, but rather a demand on scarce resources and another problem to be managed (Workman, 2015; Davidson, 2014 ).
An example of how this cultural predisposition impedes successful implementation of new technology comes from Barry Bozeman's case study (Bozeman, 2002 ) of a major technology initiative of the Internal Revenue Service: the Tax Systems Modernization (TSM)
program undertaken in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The need for a largescale update of the IRS's tax systems technology was uncontested and compelling. Yet, the TSM program was largely a failed enterprise (Bozeman, 2002; Vann, 2011) . Bozeman concluded that a principal cause of failure was an organizational culture of extreme risk-averseness. Of course, it is possible that the IRS culture was idiosyncratic, but this was not the experience of a consultant interviewed by Bozeman, who had worked on IT projects in other federal agencies. This consultant compared his experience at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which undertook a comparably large technological overhaul of a "mission critical" system: "At FAA the culture was so risk averse that it was better to do nothing except what is safe. Operations were too risky." (Bozeman, 2002) .
As noted earlier, those charged with implementing the Bush Administration eRulemaking
Initiative struggled against entrenched aspects of agency culture (Morales, 2003) . This struggle persisted over the years of development and implementation (Committee on the Status and Future of Federal eRulemaking, 2008), even though the President had ordered agencies to participate. The resulting Regulations.gov system digitized the existing rulemaking process rather than working any significant process change. This suggests how difficult it will be to persuade agencies to adopt the new technology of public participation systems that enable a broader range of participants to take part in rulemaking. Because agencies' current practices meet their notice-and-comment responsibilities, there is no external compulsion for change.
Moreover, by bringing new voices into the process -voices that represent different interests and have different modes of participation than experienced commenters ) -public participation systems like RegulationRoom introduce potentially disruptive new variables into the established rulemaking process.
C. Institutional Context
Relationships with other institutions of government -especially the judiciary and Congress -amplify rulemaking agencies' disposition to avoid risk. Rulemaking is a long and resource-intensive process. EPA, one of the most prolific federal rulemakers, estimates a 3-5 year timeline for a major rule (Kerwin, 2003) . Virtually all major rules are challenged in court by an interest that is affected by the new regulation; indeed, it is not uncommon for the agency to be challenged simultaneously by one side for doing too much and by the other side for doing too little. A significant portion of these judicial challenges result in invalidating, or at least delaying, at least a portion of the new regulation. Even though the agency will often be able to remediate the problem perceived by the court, and implement the same or substantially the same regulation as the agency originally preferred, a court loss imposes heavy resource and public relations costs.
Moreover, it defers implementation of the solution that the agency believes is required by its regulatory mandate. with the rollout of HealthCare.gov (Shear, 2014) . In an example even closer to the subject of this paper, EPA encountered a political firestorm over its use of social media in the 2014 Clean Water Rule rulemaking (Lipton and Shear, 2015) . This new regulation proposed to redefine the meaning of the term "waters of the United States," which is the Clean Water Act's method of describing the bodies of water EPA may regulate (Definition of "Waters of the United States,"
2014). The proposed definition broadened EPA's jurisdiction and was sharply opposed by, among others interests, the powerful agricultural lobby, and the rulemaking had come to the attention of many members of Congress. EPA has been one of the most proactive agencies in incorporating social media tools into its regulatory processes. In the Waters of the U.S.
rulemaking it used, for the first time, an app called Thunderclap (Lipton & Shear, 2015) . Selfdescribed as "the first-ever crowdspeaking platform" and by others as "an online flash mob,"
Thunderclap allows large groups of people to share a single message at once (Thunderclap; Lipton and Shear, 2015) . EPA's Thunderclap message was: "Clean water is important to me. I support E.P.A.'s efforts to protect it for my health, my family and my community." (Lipton and Shear, 2015.) . Even before EPA's final decision on the rulemaking in August 2015, opponents were outraged (Lipton and Shear, 2015) . The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works requested an opinion on the legality of EPA's conduct from the Government Accountability Office, an independent agency that works for Congress and is often referred to as its watchdog. GAO's December 2015 finding lambasted the agency: "EPA's use of Thunderclap constituted covert propaganda, in violation of the publicity or propaganda prohibition," a law 5 that prohibits agencies from using appropriations for unauthorized publicity or propaganda purposes (Lipton and Davenport 2015; GAO, 2015 Act, which has passed in the House, provides: "After notice or advance notice of a proposed rulemaking, the agency making the rule is prohibited from: (1) advocating for the submission of information to form part of the record of review, (2) appealing to the public to undertake advocacy, or (3) communicating for publicity or propaganda within the United States in a manner not authorized by Congress" (Regulatory Accountability Act, 2017).
Given these highly publicized examples, a rulemaking agency's wariness of technological innovation in the rulemaking process is hardly unreasonable. Adopting technologies that inject more, and different, kinds of public participation into the process will predictably make the agency's task more onerous, for the participation of new voices can be expected to introduce facts, perspectives, and concerns different than those of the existing players. Moreover, process innovation is perilous because it multiplies the possible bases on which the final rule can be attacked in the judicial arena, and it can provide the agency's political overseers with an ostensibly substance-neutral basis on which to attack a controversial regulatory program.
In sum, for rulemaking agencies, adopting socio-technological systems that alter the rulemaking process is tantamount to creating a problem (e.g., more work, more resources, unknown impact on judicial review, potential for political fallout) to solve a problem (a lack of broad-scale public participation) that really does not exist from the perspective of fulfilling the agency's legal responsibilities in notice-and-comment rulemaking. Altering the established rulemaking system by adding more public participation is a risky endeavor that has little potential for reward.
Conclusions and Future Study
Our experience with RegulationRoom has shown that achieving adoption of participatory eRulemaking platforms depends far less on technology than on overcoming the culture of risk adverseness in rulemaking agencies. During the course of our research, we have encountered members of agency rulemaking teams who are highly skeptical of (if not openly hostile to) the idea of more public participation. They associate more public participation-and, in particular, more online participation-with mass e-mail campaigns and similar high-volume/low-value comments. Rulewriters have had to manage this material, along with all the other information generated in the rulemaking, often under time pressure and almost always without additional resources.
We suggest future research needs to focus on how to overcome not only the practical legal and resource barriers, but in how to change the culture in agencies to value and accept the new form of broader rulemaking participation. If agencies, however, are unable to overcome ingrained cultural values and tendencies detrimental to new, better, and broader participation, then perhaps future research should also focus on how to leverage agencies' current organizational culture. That is, future research could work on how to make agencies believe that new forms of public participation are a necessary tool to mitigate a bigger, scarier problem-an underrepresented populace leading to government inefficiency.
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